

•"Agency" status – Phineas securities trade better then comparable AAA companies due to implicit government support

•Capital advantage - ability to act as AAA guarantor irrespective of actual rating

Process advantages

•SEC exemption

(except anti-fraud provisions)

•Obligations issuable and payable thru Federal Reserve facilities

•State and local income tax exemption

•A direct (although not explicitly stated) consequence of charter benefits is Phineas's scale. This drives several competencies / advantages including:

•Broad network of relationships in industry

- •Focused expertise in risk management
- •Wealth of market data and information
- •Ability to set market standards
- •Strong and respected brand








	Sources of Costs	2000-2004	<b>Costs</b> 2005-2008	Expected Legislation
Housing Goals: Explicit costs: Meeting the goals required by HUD regulations Consequences of missing goal is reputation risk primarily. HUD has enforcement authorities. It can compel a compliance plan and impose cease and desist authorities for failure to produce an approved plan.	Transactions to close gaps Administrative costs of compliance and reporting Product subsidies Prospect of an underserved markets fund	High SF refinances lowered market opportunity below goals levels in 2002 and 2003, requiring extraordinary activities to meet goals Investor channel deal costs were significant vs. model fees/opportunity costs Multifamily housing 2003 WAMU and World Savings deals came with large costs and significant administrative expenses Flow contribution to costs hard to discern Ongoing administrative costs for housing goals compliance are minimal	HUD has increased goals that reach likely unsustainable levels by 2008 Increasing goals also mean susceptibility to costs incurred during another single-family refinance boom Need to maintain MF production volumes even in midst of uneconomical market conditions Possibility that HUD will regulate to diminish effects of single-family refinances Increased compliance costs from new certification requirements embedded in regulations	Increased targeting of percent-of-business goals to CRA levels; New regulator to set goals based on new definitions, but also with arguably more limited discretion Prospect of relief on percent-of-business goals: House bill excludes SF refinances, separates single-family and multifamily goals, and has SF goals set based on market standard New compliance costs for meeting "duty to serve"; increased use of enforcement penalties 5% underserved markets fund comprised

# Conceptualizing Market Leadership Costs

	Sources of Costs	2000-2004	2005-2008	Expected Legislation
Market Leadership: Lead the Market in Minority Lending Implicit Costs: Not required by regulation but goal is embedded in HUD's analysis supporting housing goals requirements Consequences of missing goal is reputation risk	Transactions to close gaps Administrative costs Special marketing and product efforts MF not relevant	High levels of uncertainty with respect to size of the market. Effort follows poor performance vs. 1999 HMDA HUD compares Fannie Mae to a market that included more subprime than our extant business Investor channel costs vs. model fees/opportunity costs Some identifiable and costly flow channel efforts to meet these goals Administrative costs for planning and strategy are significant	High levels of uncertainty with respect to size of the market. Fannie Mae has caught up to market since 1999 and exceeded HUD's standard in most recent years Business has significantly closed gap with market: costs of attainment may drop depending upon future of PLS market. Decline in FHA market share and rapid growth in PLS market has made this goal more daunting in 2005 Additional flow strategies, new channels, new products under consideration	Unclear if new regulator will continue to place emphasis on minority lending, but legislation to include new concepts of leadership in MH, preservation, and subprime Will likely remain part of our corporate culture and goals.

	Sources of Costs	2000-2004	2005-2008	Post-Legislation
Other Mission Activities:	Transactions to meet toughest housing challenges	American Dream Commitment: Most of the goals embedded in the business	American Dream Commitment Most of the goals embedded in the business	Revitalized <i>ADC 3.0.</i> On- going mission focus as part of core values.
Implicit costs: Includes those other activities undertaken in the spirit of meeting our self- defined public purposes to expand homeownership, create affordable rental housing opportunity, and serve comunities	Administrative costs Product subsidies Grants and Subsidies	ACF: Increased efforts to manage business to cover costs NCLC: Have central mission focus without dedicated P&L. Drive business through special affordable housing outreach to lenders, relationships with non- traditional partners, and pilots, and experiments. Partnerships & Partnership Offices: Have central mission focus, with no dedicated revenue source Fannie Mae Foundation	ACF: Moving to generate sufficient revenue to make money NCLC: Moving to closer alignment with single-family business objectives and strategies Partnerships & Partnership Offices: Merged with ACF Moving to more explicitly cover these costs with new revenues within 2 years Fannie Mae Foundation: Diminished support while building capital	Can new business opportunities in the mission space cover ACF, NCLC, and PO costs? Wi legislation limit these activities through bright lines and/or program approvals? Levels of cross- subsidization, corporate contributions, and charitable work should b open question for the organization if the 5% fund is enacted




## **Annual Mission-Related Costs** Averaged \$95 million, 2000-2003

Costs of Meeting Mission: Administrative Costs, Expenses, Contributions

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Affordable Housing/Minority Leadership Goals				
Non-NCLC Goals Regulatory Compliance Costs	2,632,500	2,827,500	3,412,500	5,947,500
WaMu Incremental Expenses (2003)				2,346,451
MF Costs of Managing Cal Fed, WAMU, etc.	:	100,000	300,000	1,653,549
Leadership Goals (assume 15 FTEs, data costs)		3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000
Subtotal Housing Goals Costs	2,632,500	6,427,500	7,212,500	13,447,500
Other Mission Activities				
American Communities Fund 1/	8,000,000	6,448,000	8,641,000	10,874,000
HCD Regions, POs, NCLC	:			
Regions, POs			39,469,700	44,239,100
NCLC	:		19,852,100	22,270,400
Regions, POs, NCLC Combined	53,300,000	54,500,000	-	
Other Allocated Costs	8,700,000	10,500,000	13,078,200	12,814,500
Corporate Contributions 2/	5,000,000	18,858,616	7,961,553	14,002,854
Contributions to the FNM Foundation		300,000,000	35,000,000	44,375,000
Total Admin, Expenses, and Charitable	\$77,632,500	\$ 396,734,116	\$ 131,215,053	\$ 162,023,354
Total w/o Foundation	\$77,632,500	\$ 96,734,116	\$ 96,215,053	\$ 117,648,354

1/ Includes some administrative costs associated with Historic Tax Credits 2/ Includes Local Leadership Fund, Law and Policy, Executive Offices, and Others



### Housing Goals In Flow Channel Only Became More Costly that Non-Goals Business in 2003

• For the baseline period, it is hard to discern a fundamental marginal cost to meeting the housing goals on the single-family business side.

• Loans that met the low-mod and special affordable housing goals actually had a smaller negative gap than did the loans that did not meet the housing goals over the 2000-2002 period.

- This picture changed only slightly for the low-mod goal in 2003.
- The picture will change going forward as goals are ratcheted upward.

	2000	2000 2001 2002		2001		2001 2002 2003		2001		2001		2001		2002		2002 2003		2003		
	Vol \$	Gap	Vol \$	<u>Gap</u>	Vol \$	Gap	Vol \$	Gap	Vol \$	Gap										
Low Mod																				
Meets	69,966,765,110	-6.08	180,961,359,168	-8.83	261, 592, 201, 146	-3.26	434, 449, 672, 630	-1.26	208,691,007,808	-0.86										
Does NOT Meet / Missing	141,255,799,672	-7.52	357, 233, 355, 084	-9.83	485, 785, 245, 509	-3.70	802,064,428,270	-1.00	339, 466, 985, 152	-0.06										
Special Affordable																				
Meets							133,090,763,679													
Does NOT Meet / Missing	168,886,536,005	-8.09	483, 164, 315, 065	-9.64	665,847,893,992	-3.59	1,099,725,100,000	-1.05	476,624,414,892	-0.23										
Underserved	-																			
Meets	51,984,086,680	-6.76	126,963,675,736	-9.48	177, 141, 909, 973	-4.26	290,832,321,154	-1.84	152,724,029,767	-1.33										
Does NOT Meet / Missing	160,987,305,873	-6.78	410,688,043,348	-9.03	570, 249, 100, 545	-2.85	942,418,048,396	-0.40	396, 326, 975, 229	0.39										

**Difficult to Assign Costs to SF Flow Business** -- Cross-subsidies exist throughout the business to meet various business objectives -- Prominent goals-rich business lines are gap positive

### GAP AND GOALS PERFORMANCE BY CHANNEL AND PRODUCT

JAN - DEC 2003 (PRELIM) SUBSET: TOTAL SF (EXCLUDES PRIVATE LABEL SECURITIES) Note: Minority scores are for the primary market subset only (PMM, owner-occ. loans in MSAs, excuding gov't & reverse).

			TOTA	L	GUAR	ANTEE FEE	S (BPS)				MINO	RITY SUE	BSET
					(MCM C	W 2.0, RES	T CW 1.0)	LOW/	SPC	UNDS	AFR		TOTAI
			UPB					MOD	AFF		AMER	HISP	MIN
CHANNEL	PRODUCT	PMM / REFI	(\$000)	UNITS	MODEL	CHARGED	GAP	%	%	%	%	%	%
TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	1,322,360,045	9,067,147	21.58	20.90	-0.68	44.2%	16.3%	27.3%	5.7%	11.0%	26.09
LENDER	TOTAL	TOTAL	1,140,130,651	7,692,843	20.16	19.65	-0.51	43.2%	15.7%	25.8%	4.3%	8.8%	22.6
	CLOSER LOOK	TOTAL	26,533,348	200,800	84.93	89.92	4.99	60.6%	26.4%	38.0%	16.2%	17.4%	39.3
	LOW DOWN PMT	TOTAL	12,814,132	94,239	33.12	41.16	8.03	55.6%	20.4%	32.8%	8.5%	13.6%	26.9
	ALT-A	TOTAL	12,673,516	83,165	29.13	33.49	4.36	38.5%	14.6%	34.8%	2.7%	11.3%	32.3
	30-YEAR FRM	TOTAL	617,907,128	3,884,855	21.34	17.05	-4.28	46.5%	17.1%	25.9%	3.8%	8.4%	20.6
		PMM	152,425,245	969,550	20.45	17.03	-3.42	46.5%	17.1%	25.7%	3.8%	8.4%	20.6%
		REFI: CASH	190,807,626	1, 195, 104	29.14	20.01	-9.14	50.9%	20.1%	29.4%			
		REFI: R & T	274,674,257	1,720,201	16.39	15.01	-1.38	43.3%	15.0%	23.4%			
	15-YEAR FRM	TOTAL	302,054,713	2,364,059	10.91	15.39	4.47	36.4%	12.6%	25.1%	1.7%	6.7%	28.8
		PMM	16,024,121	129,095	12.40	16.68	4.28	41.9%	17.1%	28.7%	1.7%	6.7%	28.8
		REFI: CASH	107,631,787	839,496	14.38	17.62	3.23	38.2%	13.3%	27.8%			
		REFI: R & T	178,398,805	1,395,468	8.69	13.93	5.24	34.7%	11.7%	23.2%			
	OTHER FRM	TOTAL	71,170,712	499, 199	17.75	20.18	2.44	42.5%	14.2%	23.9%	2.1%	6.0%	16.79
	ARM	TOTAL	91,617,682	518,257	22.93	25.27	2.34	39.3%	12.4%	21.4%	2.5%	5.9%	20.9
	ALL OTHERS	TOTAL	5,359,421	48,269	16.98	23.26	6.28	86.8%	80.1%	38.6%	3.6%	3.6%	15.5

Costs of Meeting Mission: Business Opp	orunity Costs			
Affordable Housing/Minority Leadership Goals	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>2003</u>
Single-Family Business Investor Channel Goals Transactions (HIGH) 1/ Investor Channel Goals Transactions (LOW) 2/ RBMG Channel 3/	\$ - \$	-	\$52,000,000 \$ \$26,000,000 \$ \$	237,000,0 80,000,0 342,000,00
Multifamily Transactions WaMu (2003) 4/ World Savings (2003)				8,600,0
2002 Deals 5/ Other Mission Activities			4,467,382	
American Communities Fund 6/		(5.040.000)	(7.04.7.000)	
Debt (Revenues) Equity (Losses)		(5,910,000) 3,639,000	(7,217,000) 5,722,000	(6,587,0) 7,359,0
CDFIs 6/	162,667	117,405	5,935,965	940,63
Total Business Costs (HIGH)	162,667	(2,153,595)	60,908,347	589,312,6
Total Business Cests (LOW)	162,667	(2,153,595)	34,908,347	432,312,6
NOTES 1/ Investor Channel High Costs 2002/2003: Based on r 2/ Investor Channel Low Costs 2002/2003: Based on r 3/ RBMG: based on 10% loss on sale of certain RBMG 4/ WaMu 2003 Transaction. Economic Cost of Transac	odel fee at 11% ROC assets applied to enti	vs. charged fee regr re production	essed for goals rich	

## Cost of Goals Business Through Investor Channel Estimated at \$25-70 million per Year

### **Costs of Investor Channel Deals**

1/ 2/	2002	2003
Cost of <u>deals</u> with fees at negative gap 3/	\$26 million	\$80 million
Costs of individual goals loans in deals with positive gap 4/	\$0-26 million	\$0-157 million
Range	\$26-52 million	\$80-237 million
Average Annual Cost 2000-2004 5/	\$25-70	million

1/ Assumes price paid for by third party seeking risk at 11% return on capital (per Citigroup cost of funds analysis) vs. 14% return on capital (ROC) assumed in Fannie Mae models

2/ Assumes third party evaluates risk using models similar to to Fannie Mae's models, except for lower expected ROC

3/ Assumes costs only for those transactions where the deal showed negative gap (charged fee less than model fee)

4/ Based on regression using negative gap against percent of affordable unit in the investor channel deal to price negative gap on units acquired in otherwise gap positive deals. The lower end of the range assumes deal price reflects concessions for other than goals considerations; high end of range assumes prices attributable entirely to goals business.

5/ Assumes no mission-specific transactions in 2000, 2001, 2004 at negative gap given relative performance of business against housing goals targets in those years.

Assumes PV Factor of 3.5X

